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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
V E R D O N W O O L S E Y and 
C L E A WOOLSEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
 i 
Case No. 
vs
- I 13884 
E L L E N B. BROWN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
N A T U R E OF CASE 
Action by appellants for specific performance upon 
claimed oral agreement of sale of residence. Respond-
ent counterclaims for unlawful detainer by virtue of a 
Notice to Quit having been previously served on ap-
pellants. Judgment was rendered for respondent upon 
her counterclaim. 
S T A T E M E N T OF FACTS 
In 1960 appellants rented a home owned by re-
spondent in American Fork, Utah, as tenants at will. 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I n 1961 appellants asked respondent if they could buy 
the home. I t was agreed that if appellants would pay 
$1,337.00 in 30 days with $630.00 credit to be given 
for 9 months rent at $70.00 per month ( T R . p . 49) 
such sale would be made. Payment of $470.00 was 
made Apri l 12, 1961 (Exh. No. 2) and $180.00 paid 
on Apri l 27, 1962, (Exh. No. 3) but no further pay-
ment tendered until Apri l 20, 1966, when $49.00 was 
sent to respondent which she refused (Exh. No. 4) and 
returned through her attorney (Exh. No. 15). 
I n the meantime appellants lived in the home and 
paid $81.00 per month to the mortgage holder. I n May 
of 1966 appellants' attorney wrote respondent and en-
closed a prepared Uniform Real Esta te Contract to 
be executed by respondent (Exh. No. 7 ) . This prepared 
contract was back dated to Apri l 12, 1961; proposed 
Sellers (respondent) pay property taxes, mortgage in-
surance, and fire insurance; interest was proposed at 
6%. Such proposed contract was not acceptable and 
Mrs. Brown's attorney so advised Mr. Knowlton (Exh . 
No. 15). 
I n 1966, about the time appellants sent the pro-
posed contract, respondent called appellant and "threat-
ened to kick us out" ( T R . p . 16). A t this time appel-
lants admit that respondent told them they were not 
buyers ( T R . p. 21) . Appellants stayed in possession 
of said home as tenants paying $81.00 per month until 
the 10th of October, 1973, when a Notice to Quit (Exh. 
No. 8) was served. Shortly thereafter an action was 
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filed by appellants for specific performance. 
No agreement was reached as to interest (TR. p. 
25, p. 39) ; no agreement was reached as to taxes and 
were paid by respondent (TR. p. 44) ; the price is dis-
puted as evidenced by appellants so called tender of 
$600.00 following the trial (TR. p. 76). 
Respondent testified that the average reasonable 
rental value during the period of appellants' possession 
was $125.00 per month and such testimony was not re-
futed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NO ENFORCEABLE AGREEMENT WAS 
CONSUMATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES 
BECAUSE OF UNCERTAINTY AND INDEF-
INITENESS AS TO TERMS. 
I t is fundamental that no person may be subjected 
by law to a contractual obligation unless the character 
of the obligation is definitely fixed by an express or 
implied agreement of the parties. See 17 Am. Jur. 2d 
p. 413 § 75. 
This rule of law takes on added significance when 
attempting to enforce an oral contract for the sale of 
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land because such agreement is basically unenforceable 
by virtue of 25-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. 
This Court has so held in numerous decisions, as 
expressed in Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah 78, 125 
P . 2d 413: 
" A n oral contract for the purchase of real 
property must be sufficiently definite and cer-
tain so that it can be enforced by the court. Unti l 
the parties have agreed as to the terms, there is 
not an enforceable contract in fact, and partial 
performance cannot make up for the deficiency 
in the understanding between the parties." 
See also: Price v. Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86P. 767; 
Montgomery v. Berrett , 40 Utah 385, 121 P . 569 
(Must establish terms with greater degree of cer-
tainty than is required in action at law.) ; Adams 
v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P . 465 (Memo 
citing receipt as par t payment but insufficient 
because of failure to prove "clearness and exact-
ness" necessary.) ; Hargreaves v. Burton, 59 
Utah 575, 206^P. 262; I n Re. Roth's Estate, 2 
Utah 2d 40, 269 P . 2d 278 ("An oral contract 
for purchase of land . . . must be definite, certain 
and fa i r . " ) ; Christensen v. Christensen, 9 Utah 
2d 102, 339 P . 2d 101. 
I n the case at hand no understanding was arrived 
at as to payment of taxes, interest, or insurance by the 
admission of appellants. H o w can the court intervene 
to enforce such an incomplete agreement? 
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P O I N T I I 
A P P E L L A N T S CLAIM FOR S P E C I F I C 
P E R F O R M A N C E IS B A R R E D BY T H E 
S T A T U T E OF L I M I T A T I O N S . 
In 1966 the appellants were notified by respondent, 
and so admit (TR. p. 16-21) that they were not buying 
the home and they had no contract. Knowing the posi-
tion taken by respondent and knowing no written docu-
ment existed detailing rights of the parties the ap-
pellants waited in excess of six years to bring an action 
for specific performance which exceeds the time allowed 
under 78-12-23 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, even 
if a written contract had existed. 
' At the time of notice by respondent that no con-
tract existed, there was, under appellants' theory of 
this case, a breach. Thus, the statute commenced to 
run at this time. I t is well established that equity aids 
the vigilant and refuses to help those who sleep on their 
rights. 
P O I N T I I I 
A P P E L L A N T IS C H A R G E A B L E W I T H 
R E A S O N A B L E R E N T A L V A L U E OF P R O P -
E R T Y W H E R E NO CONTRACT E X I S T E D 
A N D F O R T R E B L E D A M A G E S W H I L E I N 
U N L A W F U L D E T A I N E R . 
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There being no agreement as to rent the law is 
that a reasonable rental will be paid by the tenant, 49 
Am. Jur. 2d § 516 p. 496, Krousky v. Hensleigh, 146 
Mont. 486, 409, P . 2d 537. 
Appellants knew, after 1966, that they were not 
buying and no rent had been established. Thus, the 
only guide to rental value is the testimony of respondent 
of $125.00 per month (TR. p. 73). Appellants did not 
see fit to come forward with any contradictory testi-
mony. 
Appellants admit proper service of Notice to Quit 
(TR .p. 25) and starting on the 26th day of October, 
1973, were in unlawful letainer. The judgment was 
entered on the 26th day of September, 1974, and the 
reasonable rental trebled for this period equals 
$2,750.00. 
If the respondent's position is supported, the ap-
pellants were in unlawful detainer as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courts findings should be supported 
when there is a variance as to facts. Equity has been 
served since appellants have been in possession of a 
residence for which they are being charged fair rental 
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value. Therefore, the judgment of the lower court 
should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H E B E R GRANT I V I N S 
Attorney for Respondent 
75 North Center 
American Fork, Utah 84003 
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